Bloodstained Fatwa: The fatal alliance between left-wing groups and the Islamic revolution in Iran

Some leftist factions have embraced the phrase ‹the enemy of my enemy is my friend,› even if it means aligning with groups like Hamas or Hezbollah—organizations that fundamentally contradict their professed core values of secularism and gender equality. The relationship between leftists and Islamist movements has been shaped by a complex set of historical events and ideological developments.

The Iranian Revolution provides a key example of how alliances can form between leftists and Islamists, despite their stark ideological differences. Various factions, including Marxist groups, participated in protests alongside religious groups. Despite underlying ideological differences, this coalition was united by a common goal: overthrowing the Shah. The leftists interpreted Khomeini's stance against Big Satan (the U.S.) and Small Satan (Europe) as an anti-imperialist position, which resonated with their ideological framework. However, this coalition was short-lived.

During this period, theater played an essential role in reflecting and responding to the evolving social dynamics. One of the most significant contributions to Iranian theater in the post-revolutionary era came from Saeed Soltanpour, a prominent figure in Iranian street theater, with his play Abbas Agha Kargar.

Saeed Soltanpour was (likely) born in 1940, at a time of profound political and social upheaval in Iran. His formative years coincided with a period of intense political ferment, particularly surrounding the Pahlavi regime and the growing momentum toward the 1979 Islamic Revolution. These tumultuous events would profoundly influence his artistic vision and political consciousness. ¹

As a young man, Soltanpour became actively involved in leftist political movements. He joined the Iranian Writers' Association and aligned himself with the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, a Marxist-Leninist group that advocated for revolutionary change. This engagement with radical politics reflected his commitment to social justice and the transformation of Iranian society. He faced imprisonment under both the Shah's regime and the Islamic Republic. ²

His works are marked by their bold, experimental, and politically charged nature, often aiming to address social issues and critique political regimes. Soltanpour’s approach to theater was notably influenced by the idea of «theater for the people»—a form of public theater that transcended the formalities and exclusivity of conventional stage performances, and instead sought to engage directly with a broader, often working-class, audience.

His poetry served as a tool for social and political change, illustrating the effects of revolution on Iranian society. He critiqued the socio-political conditions of his time, highlighting the struggles of the working class and the consequences of armed conflict. His writing, infused with themes of rage and revolutionary fervor, employed metaphors of fire, seasons, and nature to symbolize transformation and revolution. Time was also a recurring motif, with contrasts between the past, present, and future. ^{3, 4}

Soltanpour initially sympathized with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the ideals of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Like many intellectuals, artists, and activists of the time, he was hopeful about the promises of change and social justice the revolution seemed to offer. In its early stages, many Iranians, including Soltanpour, were inspired by Khomeini's call for a government based on Islamic principles and his opposition to the Shah's widely condemned, corrupt regime.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ascended to power through a complex series of events, marked by significant U.S. intervention. In 1953, the United States and Britain orchestrated Operation Ajax, a covert operation to overthrow Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The move, aimed at protecting Western oil interests and curbing perceived communist threats, was carried out by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in August 1953, ultimately consolidating the Shah's control over Iran. ^{5, 6}

This intervention solidified the Shah's position, allowing him to rule as a pro-Western monarch for 26 years. After the coup, the United States took several measures to strengthen his power. Washington invested heavily in Iran’s economic recovery, provided military aid, and sent CIA experts to train a new intelligence agency, which later became the Shah's notorious secret police force, SAVAK. SAVAK instilled fear in the populace, effectively suppressing opposition and dissent. ^{5, 7}

In 1972, President Nixon visited the Shah and offered him the ability to purchase any weapon system he desired, except nuclear weapons, in exchange for ensuring U.S. security interests in the region. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the ensuing oil price hike, the Shah used Iran's newfound wealth to buy massive quantities of high-tech weaponry from the U.S. The relationship with the Shah became unquestionable within the U.S. government.

The U.S. scaled back its intelligence gathering inside Iran, leading to a lack of awareness about growing opposition to the Shah's rule. By the late 1970s, By the late 1970s, U.S. regional policy had become so dependent on the Shah that it created a too big to fail situation. This close relationship between the U.S. and the Shah ultimately contributed to the anti-American sentiment that fueled the 1979 Iranian Revolution. ^{5, 8, 41}

This policy was partly rooted in the Green Belt Theory, a Cold War-era geopolitical concept. It proposed that Western powers, particularly the United States, support the creation of a «belt» of Islamic states around the Soviet Union as a strategic measure to contain Soviet expansion. The goal was to weaken and destabilize the USSR by promoting Islamist movements as a counterforce. Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, played a key role in shaping this policy. ^{9, 10, 42}

Initially, both the Tudeh Party and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) supported Ayatollah Khomeini due to their shared opposition to the Shah's regime. They viewed Khomeini's anti-imperialist rhetoric as aligned with their own goals against Western influence, particularly from the United States.

This support was partly shaped by a broader international communist strategy, which sought alliances with anti-imperialist movements in developing countries. The Tudeh Party's close ties with the Soviet Union significantly influenced its backing of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Founded in 1941, the Tudeh Party became a pro-Soviet organization following the Iran crisis of 1946, often prioritizing Soviet interests over Iranian national sovereignty—an alignment that later damaged its reputation among the Iranian public. ^{11, 12, 13, 14}

The MEK was initially an Islamist organization, with Taqi Shahram, a prominent member, serving on its Central Committee from 1972 to 1975. During this time, the MEK's ideology combined ‹Islam with revolutionary Marxism,› offering a revolutionary reinterpretation of Shia Islam influenced by the writings of Ali Shariati. Shahram played a key role in the MEK's shift from Islamist ideology to Marxism. By the spring of 1975, he had fully embraced Marxism and began advocating for the organization to adopt this new ideology. His actions led to a significant purge within the MEK, eliminating the Islamist faction and solidifying its Marxist orientation.

When Majid Sharif-Vaghefi, an Iranian dissident and leading member of the MEK, resisted the ideological shift, Shahram played a key role in his elimination. It was largely on Shahram's initiative that Sharif-Vaghefi was killed, his body immolated, and reportedly discarded near the Tehran-Karaj highway outside the city. ¹⁵

Some leftist organizations believed that supporting Khomeini would help establish a government that could later be influenced or transformed into a socialist regime. They saw Khomeini as a transitional figure who could pave the way for socialism after the Shah's overthrow. They underestimated both his ability to consolidate power and his unwavering commitment to an Islamic state. This miscalculation proved disastrous, as Khomeini's regime swiftly turned against leftist groups. ^{14, 16, 17}

Political freedom began to erode just a year into the Revolution. While Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had been overthrown, Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's provisional government did not last long. The government resigned on November 5, 1979, the day after Ayatollah Khomeini's followers stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking dozens of Americans hostage. The Iran hostage crisis played a significant role in Jimmy Carter's loss in the 1980 presidential election. The ongoing crisis was a constant reminder of Carter's perceived weakness in foreign policy, with ABC News airing nightly reports titled «America Held Hostage: Day X». ^{18, 19}

After the revolution, leftist ideologies were largely marginalized in Iranian society. While some elements of leftist thought were incorporated into the Islamic Republic's policies, the core leftist movements were effectively excluded from political discourse. Despite their early involvement, leftist parties like the Tudeh Party struggled to gain broad public support due to their historical ties to the Soviet Union and perceptions of being foreign agents. The party’s backing of Soviet policies, including oil concessions and support for ethnic revolts, reinforced its image as a foreign-backed organization rather than a genuine national movement.

Tudeh's close relationship with the Soviet Union alienated many Iranians, who viewed communism as a threat to Iranian identity and independence. This perception was deepened by the party’s involvement in supporting separatist movements in regions like Azerbaijan during the 1940s. As the Islamic Revolution gained momentum, many citizens were wary of Tudeh's influence due to its historical association with Soviet imperialism. This lack of grassroots support diminished its political relevance as the Islamic Republic consolidated power. ^{11, 14, 20, 21}

Khomeini and his followers quickly turned against leftist groups, viewing them as threats to their authority. This led to violent crackdowns, with many leftists executed or imprisoned, and their organizations dismantled. The 1980s, particularly the period from 1980 to 1988, marked the darkest and bloodiest chapter in contemporary Iranian history.

The Tudeh Party was banned in 1982, and many of its members were either executed or imprisoned during subsequent purges. Between 1980 and 1985, an estimated 8,000 to 9,500 Iranians were executed. The Tudeh Party reports that thousands of its members were either executed or killed under torture, particularly during the early years of the Islamic Republic's intense political purges. ^{11, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24}

Between June 1981 and April 1982, around 3,500 MEK members were executed or killed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Taqi Shahram was arrested on a Tehran street on the night of July 3, 1980. He was convicted of «uprising against Muslim combatants» and sentenced to death. ²⁵

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Saeed Soltanpour continued to push the boundaries of Iranian theater, particularly through street theater. Performed in public spaces such as streets, marketplaces, and even in front of government buildings, street theater offered greater freedom and flexibility for creative expression. Unlike traditional theater, which is confined to a stage and audience seats, street theater engages directly with the public, bringing the performance to the people. For Soltanpour, this was a way to break down the barriers between artist and audience.

Public spaces allowed him to reach a broader cross-section of society, attracting new audiences beyond the traditional theatergoers. Many Iranians could access his work without the barriers of class or official censorship. Street theater, often appealing to working-class individuals, fostered engagement with pressing societal issues and sparked dialogue on real-world events affecting ordinary people's lives.

This form of theater also allowed performers to explore expressive forms—such as dance and female solo singing—that were otherwise restricted in formal venues, pushing the limits of what was permissible in a society where artistic freedom was often curtailed. Soltanpour’s performances incorporated interactive elements and real-life materials, such as documents, films, and news clippings, addressing topics like labor issues and social inequalities. One of his performances even attracted an audience of around 4,000 people.^{26, 27}

The form of street theater itself plays an integral role in the way Soltanpour conveys his message in his play Abbas Agha Kargar. The title character, Abbas, serves as a representative figure of the everyday Iranian, someone who is caught between the traditional values of the past and the rapid changes brought about by the revolution, who is both a victim and an active participant in the changing dynamics of post-revolutionary Iran. Soltanpour's work critiques the idealism of revolution. While the revolution promised a better future for the Iranian people, Abbas Agha Kargar explores the disillusionment and frustration felt by many who believed that their lives would improve but instead found themselves trapped in a system that promised liberation yet offered little real change.

However, his influence was cut short due to political repression. Iranian society was forced to adapt to a new order under theocratic rule, which imposed stricter interpretations of Islamic law, along with significant shifts in cultural production. His performances came under attack from fundamentalist groups, and in April 1981, while celebrating his wedding, he was arrested by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps for his leftist leanings. Soltanpour refused to renounce his political beliefs, stating he preferred death over compromising his convictions. He was executed on June 26, 1981. After his death, the publication and performance of his works were banned in Iran, effectively curtailing his impact on Iranian theater. ^{26, 27, 28}

In late July 1988, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa ordering the execution of political prisoners. These executions were part of a broader crackdown on political dissent following the Iran-Iraq War. The primary charges against the prisoners were based on their political affiliations and beliefs, rather than any formal legal violations. ‹Death Commissions› were established across Iran to carry out the executions. Each commission consisted of three members: a religious judge, a prosecutor, and a representative from the Ministry of Intelligence. ^{24, 29, 30}

Prisoners were brought before the Death Commissions and subjected to brief interrogations, often lasting only minutes. The questions focused mainly on their political affiliations and beliefs. Key questions included whether they still supported the MEK, which the Iranian government had labeled a terrorist organization, whether they were willing to renounce their political views, or if they would cooperate with the regime.

In addition to political questions, prisoners were often interrogated about their religious beliefs, such as whether they were Muslims and if they prayed. Responses indicating a lack of adherence to Islamic practices, particularly for those deemed non-believers or holding alternative interpretations of Islam, could result in execution. ^{23, 31, 32, 33}

Those who remained loyal to the MEK were labeled mohareb (waging war against God) and mortad (apostates from Islam). Refusing to renounce political affiliations or express repentance typically led to execution without formal charges or trials, often within days of their hearings. The commissions operated with a predetermined agenda to eliminate dissent, rather than conducting fair trials.

Even those who did not explicitly support the MEK were subjected to tests, such as coerced public confessions or forced cooperation against fellow prisoners. Ultimately, many of those executed had been imprisoned for non-violent political activities, such as distributing literature, participating in protests, or holding views contrary to the regime's ideology. ^{23, 29, 32, 34, 35, 36}

The process was highly secretive and swift. Bodies were buried in unmarked mass graves, and families were often left unaware of the fate of their loved ones. The 1988 massacre came to light in 2016 with the release of an audio recording of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's former designated successor. In the recording, Montazeri condemned the executions as 'the greatest crime' in the Islamic Republic's history. The audio provided compelling evidence of the systematic nature of the killings and the involvement of high-ranking officials, including Ebrahim Raisi, who would later become Iran's president. ^{23, 29, 31, 37}

The exact number of leftists executed in Iran, particularly during the mass executions of political prisoners in 1988, remains uncertain due to the secretive nature of the operations. However, estimates vary widely, ranging from 4,500 to 30,000. Many human rights organizations suggest that the majority of victims were members of the MEK, along with supporters of other leftist factions. ^{23, 31, 40}

The Iranian government has consistently denied the occurrence of the mass executions. Many members of the Death Commissions have retained significant positions within the government, fostering a culture of impunity regarding these human rights violations. The families of the victims continue to seek truth and justice, often facing harassment and intimidation from the authorities. Ahmad Montazeri, who released the audio recording, was charged with ‹acting against national security› and sentenced to 21 years in prison. ^{38, 39, 23, 29}

Despite historical lessons, some leftist factions continue to support Islamist movements. This is especially evident in contemporary political discourse, where certain leftists align with groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, viewing them as part of a broader struggle against imperialism. This alignment raises critical questions about how advocates for secularism, gender equality, and human rights can reconcile with movements that oppress women, punish deviations from gender norms, and use violence to enforce ideological conformity.

On this shore of fear

Saeed Soltanpour

No
I will reach
Heights of madness and fury
No
To the farthest blood-red star
I will soar and scale peaks of revulsion.

I will plunge down
Heights of fortitude
Into deepest stretches of the dark-
stained marsh
And there I will rest
Like a water-lily anticipating my
lover's anger
Shedding from my laurels the pollen of
mutiny
Upon the dead water.

Consider the plain:
Menacing waters
Feeding on our love-drenched blood.
Black are the sails
Burnt out crucifixes for these graves of
the sea.

Observe the martyrs riding westward
Hear the soreness of their blood-torn
voices
Remember in the confusion
The fishers' seasoned nets
Catching corpses
From these muddy waters.

In the fallow ground of this silence
On this shore of fear
Upon this plain of blood roses and iron
stalks
I will not stay silent.

I chose defiance
The way of those poets of the past
The way of Eshghi, the way of
Farrokhi*.
So hear my voice
As it sings in the slaughter-house.

Another colour covers my hoarsened
voice:
Rage red ferocity of an eagle
Beating its wings at twilight on the
heights.
The molten spikes of his cries
Circle and soar high over the lines
Where the future and the revolution
meet.

The waves will bring me a boat
And on the sea I will remain
Sailing across to death.
But the seeds will be there
Seeds of the ever-green flower
Seeds of my being
Planted somewhere on the road
Somewhere by the house where our
people live
In the feverish garden of the tulips.

After the dry spring of a defeated
nation
Sow the field with mingled seeds
Hide them by the furnace
Scatter them on the land
And watch them grow in silence
Into the future rising.

Adapted and translated by Patrick Cross
* Eshghi and Farrokhi, two of Iran's leading poets and political activists in the early 20th century by whom Soltanpour was influenced.

Thalysia

History and Stuff

Bloodstained Fatwa: The fatal alliance between left-wing groups and the Islamic revolution in Iran

On this shore of fear